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For many companies, incremental growth is not sufficient. The changing business landscape is forcing 
corporate leaders to learn how to reposition their businesses more fundamentally. 
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Companies make big moves when they change direction with a large commitment of resources. These 
moves typically involve a different set of products or services, a new customer base or new ways of 
operating. Nokia Corp.’s shift in the early 1990s from forestry, TVs and tires to mobile phones is an 
example of a big move. Such strategic shifts are risky — companies that attempt them often fail to meet 
their stated objectives. Yet they are essential for value creation in the long run. Although companies may 
have long periods of incremental growth, the constantly changing business environment periodically 
forces corporate leaders to reposition their businesses in fundamental ways. 
Our interest in studying big moves — specifically, why some companies succeed in making smart big 
moves while others fail — was triggered by longitudinal case studies conducted by us as well as by other 
researchers.1 These case studies included some big moves that were industry firsts and others that were in 
response to industry or macroeconomic shifts or to company-specific problems. The case studies 
suggested a number of hypotheses, which we first tested in the executive classroom and then more 
systematically on 24 multinational companies. 
 
 
About the Research 
In our research, we looked at 12 pairs of successful and less successful multinational companies from a 
variety of industries and home markets over a 15-year time frame. Among the companies we studied were 
Nokia and Ericsson in the mobile phone industry, DaimlerChrysler and BMW in the automotive industry, 
IBM and HP in the computer industry, Lipton Foods and Twinings in the beverage industry and ABB and 
ALSTOM in the engineering industry. We compared the market capitalizations of the paired companies 
from the early 1990s to the end of 2004, noting the relative shifts in their growth rates. Compared with 
other measures such as revenue or profits, market capitalization has the advantage of immediately 
reflecting the market’s evaluation of strategic shifts. Using these timelines, we then looked for patterns in 
how the strategic shifts differed. We tested the patterns through surveys and in a series of discussions with 
executives. 
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In some respects, our findings were predictable. Companies that launched successful big moves used 
sound strategic thinking: They exploited and in some instances enhanced their distinctiveness relative to 
their competitors, and they built on an existing repertoire of managerial and business experience. 
However, our most interesting discovery had to do with what we refer to as “complementarity.” The more 
successful companies followed a consistent learning logic both internally and externally with respect to 
innovation, efficiency and customer intimacy, and the most successful companies made big moves that 
were complementary over time. As a rule, complementarity plays out in three ways: (1) It builds on a 
dominant, successful business model; (2) it relies on periodic shifts in the balance between innovation, 
efficiency and customer intimacy when the business model is not working; and (3) it promotes a 
sequenced development of capabilities when the balance shifts. Together, these elements make up a 
learning logic that supports companies as they make important strategic shifts. 
 
If the Business Model Is Successful, Stay With It 
The first thing executives need to recognize is that the safest big moves build on business models that are 
already working.2 Radically changing the value proposition is riskier than acquiring new customers. So if 
the business model ain’t broke, don’t fix it—roll it out. It is better to go for a larger share of market 
among existing customers or to extend the portfolio of valuable customers with new customers, new 
geographies or digestible acquisitions. 
This is what food and household giant Unilever did with its Lipton Foods brand when it applied its 
successful hot tea business model to the ready-to-drink tea market in the late 1990s. Lipton’s tea division 
was twice as big as its closest competitor, R. Twining and Company, Ltd., and was still gaining market 
share with its existing customers as they migrated from loose tea to tea bags. But as far as Lipton was 
concerned, the market was not just the tea business but the global, branded beverage industry. In an effort 
to sell against giants such as the Coca-Cola Co. and PepsiCo Inc., it went after new customers in new 
markets (for example, pitching iced tea as an alternative for coffee drinkers). 
This strategy is similar to Nokia’s when that company brought its innovative phones to new markets in 
Europe and Asia during the 1990s. Its success was built on rolling out the basic business model that CEO 
Jorma Ollila defined in 1992: telecom-oriented, global, focused and value-adding. Not only did Nokia 
expand into new markets, it also kept adding to its product line, wooing customers in different segments 
and encouraging users to upgrade their phones whenever there were new features. Nokia stayed at the 
forefront of incremental innovation, shortening product cycles and launching new models just as margins 
on existing models dropped. By 1998, Nokia was selling three out of every 10 mobile phones and had 
overtaken Motorola Inc. as the world’s largest mobile phone maker. 
As Nokia moved to expand its set of valuable customers, Tele-fonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson tried to make 
its operations more efficient, struggling with its engineering-oriented business model. Ericsson changed 
CEOs twice in the course of 10 years, initiated a massive restructuring program and faced increasing 
negative cash flow thanks to bulging inventory and an inability to refresh its products. While Nokia was 
successful at reinforcing what it had done, Ericsson didn’t realize when it was time to change the model. 
 
Be Prepared to Shift the Balance 
The second thing executives need to understand about successful big moves is that these moves require 
management to realign the balance between innovation, efficiency and customer intimacy capabilities. 
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While each of these forces needs to be at work at all times, it is difficult to pursue them with equal 
intensity. Companies need to shift the focus of their resources depending on their current business and 
financial needs. For example, innovation typically calls for a looser organization with room for 
experimentation, entrepreneurship and flexible resources. Efficiency depends on greater coordination, 
leveraging activities in the business system and removing slack from the organization. And customer 
intimacy requires a culture of listening and networking with resources directed at building relationships 
with customers. 
A typical cycle might involve loosening the organization to stimulate top-line growth through innovation, 
followed by the need to tighten the organization to improve margins, followed by the need to get closer to 
customers again to find out what kinds of innovation they want in future products or solutions. (See “The 
Shifting Balance of Capabilities.”) 
 
THE SHIFTING BALANCE OF CAPABILITIES 
The Shifting Balance of Capabilities 
This process can be illustrated by examining Nokia’s big strategic moves over the last 15 years. During 
this time, there were two periods when management emphasized efficiency; each was followed by a 
period when management emphasized innovation. In the early 1990s, cost cutting by CEO Simo 
Vuorilehto provided the financial resources that enabled the company to introduce its mobile phones. 
However, this pioneering phase soon ran into problems: Increasing costs from inadequate logistics, 
quality control and budgeting triggered a shift away from innovation toward efficiency. The subsequent 
drive for process efficiency in turn provided the operating basis for a new growth period during the late 
1990s based on increased attention to customers and differentiating innovation. 
 
In the car industry, both the BMW Group and Daimler-Benz AG attempted to grow at different times by 
broadening their product offerings through acquiring the Rover Group and Chrysler Corp., respectively. 
But both companies ran into integration problems, forcing them to redirect their emphasis toward 
efficiency. (BMW sold most Rover brands in 2000, retaining the MINI; Daimler-Benz managed to turn 
around Chrysler and is now DaimlerChrysler.) Once efficiency was back on track, the companies again 
shifted their emphasis, this time to innovation in the form of new model development. 
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Sequence the Development of Capabilities 
The third thing executives need to keep in mind about big moves is that the capabilities needed to balance 
innovation, efficiency and customer intimacy will change as their value proposition matures. (See “The 
Capabilities Sequence.”) Competitors that miss or skip stages in the learning logic often run into 
difficulties. When power and automation technology provider ABB Asea Brown Boveri Ltd., 
headquartered in Zurich, Switzerland, tried to move from differentiating innovation to solutions 
innovation without going through process efficiency, for example, the company couldn’t deliver and 
incurred large cost overruns. The process efficiency step would have involved standardizing its 700-plus 
computer systems to build the efficiency necessary to offer global solutions to its clients. 
 
THE CAPABILITIES SEQUENCE 
The Capabilities Sequence 
In a sequence of smart big moves in the 1990s, Nokia relied on pioneering innovation to enter the mobile 
phone market, on process efficiency to lower costs and on differentiating innovation to attract new retail 
customers; it subsequently began integrating innovation to develop customized solutions for its corporate 
clients. By the end of the decade, Nokia’s brand recognition was among the best in the world. From 1995 
to 2000, its market value had increased 28 times to $210 billion. 
 
Like Nokia, Ericsson’s trajectory went through the pioneering innovation and process efficiency stages 
with its second-generation GSM (global system for mobile communications) phones. However, its 
trajectory soon diverged from Nokia’s. While Nokia created variety in its value proposition with 
differentiation, Ericsson attempted to extend its market position based on volume efficiency, which 
limited its available resources for innovation. Its rigid structure and engineering-dominated culture also 
made it difficult to create a more entrepreneurial organization and to meet the demand for more variety; 
its sales people did not know how to acquire new market segments. In addition, it was unable to increase 
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efficiency with process improvement, partly because the corporate structure was organized around strong 
country and functional heads. Without further gains in efficiency, it could not continue to compete based 
on lower costs. 
 
In 2001, Ericsson announced the largest loss in Swedish corporate history; its market capitalization had 
dropped from $131 billion at the height of the dot-com boom to $11 billion at the end of 2002, and its 
share of the mobile phone market fell from 20 % to less than 5 %. Ericsson needed to adopt a new 
business model in response to emerging technologies but, given its organizational rigidity, it was unable 
to respond. The only silver lining was that its nemesis, Nokia, was struggling with its own problems. 
 
Nobody Has a Monopoly on Smart Big Moves 
A company’s learning logic can be interrupted at any moment by external events — for example, the 
emergence of a new product market segment, a new disruptive technology or another event originating 
outside the industry. When this happens, the key success factors change. Incumbents rarely respond 
successfully because they can’t adapt quickly enough. 
Between 2000 and 2002, in the wake of the collapse of the telecom bubble, Nokia’s market value dropped 
by two-thirds to $76 billion. In response to the convergence of telecoms, computing and consumer 
electronics, Nokia management elected to redirect the strategic emphasis from differentiation to 
pioneering. First, they reorganized product and market development in the mobile phone division into 
eight customer-facing units; then they divided the entire company into four divisions: mobile phones, 
telecom equipment, business applications and multimedia devices. Unfortunately, the focus on internal 
reorganization did not lead to pioneering innovation. Instead, it had a negative effect on the rate of new-
model introduction. 
This partly explains the reversal of fortune that both Nokia and Ericsson experienced from 2002 to 2004: 
Nokia’s market capitalization declined while Ericsson’s increased. By 2002, Nokia and Ericsson were not 
just competing with each other; they were also vying with other players such as QUALCOMM Inc. and 
Samsung Group for control over the next generation of mobile hardware and software platforms. While 
Nokia was reorganizing to cope with the wave of disruptive technology, competitors were coming to 
market with innovations like clamshell phones and color screens. In the process, Nokia lost market share. 
Reorganizing to deal with a breakpoint in the learning logic, it lost focus on existing markets. 
As Nokia struggled, Ericsson, in a desperate move to save its mobile phone division, initiated a smart big 
move — perhaps its best move since the early 1990s. It set up a joint venture with Sony Corp., a company 
that understood media technology and pioneering innovation as well as any company in the market. With 
survival on the line, the atmosphere inside the joint venture was very much that of a start-up. Within the 
first year, Sony Ericsson Mobile Communications AB introduced the T68i mobile phone with color 
screen, aimed at the top end of the market. The new phone was a hit with consumers, and it was followed 
by other popular models, including the P800 and P900, which combined phone, e-mail, photo and digital 
organizer features. As a start-up, Sony Ericsson was able to compete more flexibly than Ericsson had 
before. Between 2002 and 2004, Ericsson’s market value increased by almost $40 billion, supported both 
by mobile phones and a large pick-up in telecom infrastructure spending. For its part, Nokia’s market 
value fell by $5 billion, to $71 billion. 
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A similar pattern can be observed between Hewlett-Packard Co. and IBM Corp. While IBM was surging 
ahead with its global information services, HP battled to integrate its acquisition of Compaq in an effort 
to be both low cost and high tech. It looked as though IBM would be the industry winner, with a gap of 
almost $100 billion between the two companies. But in 2002, IBM made a successful bid for Pricewater-
houseCoopers Consulting and started moving into business-process transformation services. Facing 
established competitors, it had difficulty positioning itself and integrating the consultants it had acquired. 
By early 2005, IBM shares had lost almost one-quarter of their peak 2002 value. 
 
Think Smart Before You Think Big 
Beyond complementarity, smart big moves are distinctive relative to competition and do not involve 
jumps into the unknown. But making bold, distinctive moves is easier said than done. It requires ambition 
and a can-do attitude. Unfortunately, the emotions that drive ambition frequently overpower practical 
realities: We see what we want to see. To eliminate such blinders, managers need to be brutally honest 
when examining the business case. This is what BMW’s management did when it decided to sell most of 
the Rover brands, keeping only the MINI subsidiary, which it repositioned as a sedan with the feel of a 
sports car. 
By contrast, neither IBM’s move into business-process transformation services nor Nokia’s 
reorganization were distinctive. IBM had difficulty differentiating itself from established competitors, and 
Nokia’s reorganization turned people inward, causing them to lose focus on the market. Similarly, 
Ericsson’s repeated attempts to downsize in the late 1990s did little to make its offerings more distinctive; 
instead, the cuts simply caused more downsizing. 
Companies need to invest time in developing new capabilities. Smart big moves shouldn’t be leaps into 
the unknown but extensions of the company’s existing portfolio or managerial repertoire. Few people 
would be naïve enough launch a major new product in multiple markets without trying it first in focus 
groups and test markets. Yet managers make other types of big moves—for example, large-scale 
reorganizations and huge mergers and acquisitions—without carefully exploring whether they will work. 
Such “naked” big moves call for deep transformations, involving not only new behaviors but also the 
ability to reshape the internal and external conditions to support them. 
When IBM made the big commitment to global information services, it did so with the experience of an 
already existing computer services division. When it moved into e-business, it capitalized on an existing 
frontline initiative. When Nokia moved into mobile phones, it jumped from an existing base: It had real 
experience in the area it was betting on, and its mobile telecom business was already showing promise in 
Scandinavia. By contrast, the spin-off of the Ericsson and Sony mobile phone businesses into Sony 
Ericsson was a leap into the unknown. Although Sony Ericsson has had early successes, the jury is still 
out on its long-term results. 
Smart big moves leverage the company’s previous experience, either in earlier periods, pilot projects or 
small business units. People should understand the business model, organizational requirements and 
leadership that are needed. The subtleties of the new capabilities required should be familiar to at least 
some managers. Those initiating big moves should also be clear on their personal motivations. Once the 
necessary ingredients are in place, managers should not hesitate to shift resources and decision-making 
power to the standard bearers of the new direction. 
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